Time and Materiality
A recent case from Illinois’ 2nd appellate district, Rubloff CV Machesney, LLC v. World Novelties, Inc., d/b/a Pantera Coffee and Crumbs, No. 2-05-0673 (March 3, 2006), upholds the landlord’s right to terminate a lease on account of a tenant’s default, based on the lease as written. The court dismissed the tenant’s argument that the time computation statute of Illinois should have allowed the tenant to pay its rent on the first business day of the month, rather than by the first calendar day of the month. The court also found that the landlord was entitled to terminate the lease due to the tenant’s continued failure to comply strictly with its obligations under the lease. The court’s discussion of what makes a breach “material” is thorough and careful, and a useful reminder of the procedural complications that can result when a default is required to meet a “materiality” standard before a remedy can be enforced.